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This Note examines whether Justice Goldstone’s proposal for an oil-for-food program is fea-
sible in today’s international political climate and whether it would be effective in curtailing the
violence and aiding civilians in Darfur. Part I begins by examining the reasons behind China’s
reluctance to support international initiatives to achieve peace in Darfur. Part II discusses the
U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq and outlines proposals for avoiding problems that plagued that
program. Finally, Part III takes into consideration the political and logistical difficulties that are
likely to arise from the institution of an oil-for-food program in Sudan, and concludes that such an
initiative would be a politically feasible method of placing significant pressure on the Khartoum
regime.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2004, the United Nations ("U.N.") Security
Council formally recognized the deepening state of crisis in
Darfur by voting unanimously to send an advance team to south-
ern Sudan to prepare for a peace-keeping mission.1 Since then,
the Security Council has passed another thirteen resolutions fo-
cused on ending the violence in Darfur and bringing perpetra-
tors of human rights violations to justice.2 These efforts have
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Johns Hop-
kins University. I would like to thank Justice Richard Goldstone for all of his insight
and assistance throughout this process, and my family for their constant support and
patience.
1. S.C. Res. 1547, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1547 (June 11, 2004); see also Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Endorses Establishment of 3-Month Advance Team
in Sudan to Prepare for U.N. Peace Support Operation, U.N. Doc. SC/8120 (June 11,
2004) (announcing unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1547, authoriz-
ing deployment of advance team to Sudan to prepare for future United Nations
("U.N.") peace/support operation).
2. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007) (creating African Union
("A.U.")/U.N. hybrid operation in Darfur ("UNAMID")); S.C. Res. 1755, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1755 (Apr. 30, 2007) (extending mandate of U.N. Mission in Sudan ("UNMIS"));
S.C. Res. 1709, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1709 (Sept. 22, 2006) (extending mandate of UN-
MIS); S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (expanding mandate of
UNMIS to use all necessary means to protect civilians); S.C. Res. 1679, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1679 (May 16, 2006) (threatening sanctions against any group hindering enforce-
ment of Darfur Peace Agreement ("DPA")); S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1672
(Apr. 25, 2006) (imposing sanctions on four Sudanese nationals accused of war
crimes); S.C. Res. 1663, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1663 (Mar. 24, 2006) (asking Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi Annan to expedite transition from A.U. to U.N. mission in Darfur); S.C. Res.
1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring perpetrators of human rights
abuses in Sudan to International Criminal Court ("ICC")); S.C. Res. 1591, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005) (ordering travel ban and freeze on all assets for human
rights violators in Sudan); S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005) (es-
tablishing UNMIS); S.C. Res. 1574, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1574 (Nov. 19, 2004) (reporting
results of special meeting in Nairobi to secure end of violence in Darfur); S.C. Res.
1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004) (noting Sudanese government's failure
to disarm Janjaweed militia, provide security for civilians, and bring perpetrators of
violence to justice); S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004) (imposing
arms embargo on all non-governmental combatants in Darfur).
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produced little progress on the ground, however, as stories of
horrific violence and forced migration continue to emerge from
the region.3 Human rights organizations have increasingly
blamed the international community, and China particularly, for
failing to contain the violence and provide meaningful humani-
tarian support to the people of Darfur.' Critics allege that
China's economic ties to Sudan have led it to shield the Suda-
nese government from meaningful international intervention
that could prevent further atrocities and assist displaced individ-
uals.5
This lack of progress led former South African Constitu-
tional Court Justice Richard Goldstone, a member of the Inde-
pendent Inquiry Committee ("IIC" or the "Committee") into the
U.N. Oil-For-Food Program (the "Program"),6 to propose an oil-
for-food program as an effective means of depriving the Suda-
nese government of the funds it uses to perpetuate violence in
Darfur, without harming China's strategic economic interests.7
3. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Sudan: Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Viola-
tions in Darfur, 11-24, AI Index AFR 54/019/2007, May 8, 2007 (describing continued
flow of illicit arms into Darfur, in violation of U.N. arms embargo); Alfred de Montes-
quiou, Darfur Town Held by Army Is Burned, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007, at A18 (discussing
incident where Sudanese government troops razed Darfur town in apparent retaliation
for suspected rebel attack); Jeffrey Gettleman, Witnesses Describe Another Massacre in
Southern Darfur, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 18, 2007, at 7 (reporting recent killing of over
thirty civilians by Sudanese government forces and allied Janjaweed militias).
4. See, e.g., Anna Badkhen, Sudan Sanctions Called Inadequate, S.F. CHRON., May 30,
2007, at A3 (citing expert opinion that, to be effective, any sanctions on Sudan need
backing of permanent U.N. Security Council members, particularly China); Charles
Whelan, China Unlikely to Bow to Critics on Darfur, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, May 21, 2007,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2007/O521bow.htm
(detailing international condemnation of China for allegedly shielding Sudanese gov-
ernment from sanctions and abetting genocide in Darfur); Patrick Goodenough, China
Accused of Prolonging Sudan Bloodshed Because of Oil, CNSNEws.coM, Apr. 11, 2006, http:/
/www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/2006
04/INT20060411c.html (noting criticism that China's support for Sudanese govern-
ment has prevented Security Council from taking measures that could bring end to
violence in Sudan).
5. See, e.g., Goodenough, supra note 4 (stating popular criticism that China's oil
interests in Sudan have prompted it to support Khartoum regime and "water down"
Security Council resolutions); Save Darfur Coal., China, Sudan and the Darfur Conflict
Fact Sheet, http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/china-sudan-and-the-darfurconflict_
factsheet (last visited Mar. 15, 2008) (observing that China is largest player in Sudan's
oil industry, largest foreign investor in Sudan, and Sudan's largest trading partner).
6. For more detailed information on the Independent Inquiry Committee ("IIC")
into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, see its website at http://www.iic-
offp.org/.
7. Richard Goldstone, Op-Ed., An "Oil-for-Food" Program for Darfur, INr'L HERALD
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This Note examines whether this proposal is feasible in today's
international political climate and whether it would be effective
in curtailing the violence and aiding civilians in Darfur. Part I
begins by examining the reasons behind China's reluctance to
support international initiatives to achieve peace in Darfur. Part
II discusses the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq and outlines
proposals for avoiding problems that plagued that program. Fi-
nally, Part III takes into consideration the political and logistical
difficulties that are likely to arise from the institution of an oil-
for-food program in Sudan, and concludes that such an initiative
would be a politically feasible method of placing significant pres-
sure on the Khartoum regime.
I. CHINA 'S ROLE IN THE DARFUR CRISIS
This Part begins by discussing China's economic and politi-
cal relationship with Sudan. It then examines the effect of that
relationship on China's actions in the Security Council. Finally,
this Part discusses the increased pressure China faces from the
international community and human rights organizations to use
its influence with the government of Sudan to end the violence
in Darfur.
A. China's Ties to Sudan
As China has transformed itself from an insular, largely
agrarian society into a major player in the global economy, its
increasing appetite for raw materials has led it to pursue rela-
tionships with so-called "rogue" nations that the Western world
has shunned.' To compete with the multinational titans of the
energy industry, Chinese oil companies must invest in areas
where Western companies are not able or willing to go.' This
TRm., June 13, 2007, at 4 (promoting a potential "oil-for-food" program for Darfur as
way of instituting sanctions without harming China's strategic interests in Sudan).
8. See Peter Hatemi & Andrew Wedeman, Oil and Conflict in Sino-American Relations,
CHINA SECURITYJ., Summer 2007, at 95, 108-09 (noting China's efforts to secure oil
supplies from regimes unfriendly to United States, such as Iran, Sudan, and Vene-
zuela); Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry; Beijing Supplies
Arms Used on Villagers, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 2004, at A01 (describing China's deep com-
mercial relations with Sudan).
9. See Erica S. Downs, The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations, CHINA
SECURITY J., Summer 2007, at 42, 58 (acknowledging that China National Petroleum
Company ("CNPC") took advantage of Sudan's north-south civil war and U.S. sanctions
to establish foothold in Sudan); Piet Konings, China and Africa: Building a Strategic Part-
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strategy has been particularly successful in Sudan, China's larg-
est overseas oil project."0
On June 1, 1997, China National Petroleum Company
("CNPC") formally took ownership of a forty percent share of
the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company ("GNPOC"), a
consortium that presently dominates oil production in Sudan.1
Under the operational management of CNPC's Zhou Jiping,
GNPOC transformed Sudan from a nation dependent on for-
eign energy supplies into an oil exporter.12 These develop-
ments, however, coincided with Sudanese military attacks on un-
armed civilians to clear a 100-kilometer cordon sanitaire around
Sudanese oil fields.1" CNPC and GNPOC still maintain a close
relationship with the Sudanese government, contracting with
nership, 23 J. DEVELOPING SOCIETIES 341, 352 (2007) (stating that Khartoum regime's
tactics in war and its ties to terrorist groups persuaded Western oil companies to with-
draw from Sudan); Goodman, supra note 8 (quoting Chen Fengyin, expert at China
Contemporary International Relations Institute, as saying that Sudan is example of this
strategy put into practice).
10. See Downs, supra note 9, at 58 (calling China's oil investments in Sudan its most
successful to date); Goodman, supra note 8 (stating that Sudan is China's largest over-
seas oil project).
11. CNPC is a Chinese State-owned corporation. See COAL. INT'LJUSTICE, SOIL AND
OIL: DiRTY BUSINESS IN SUDAN 19-20 (2006), available at http://www.cij.org (describing
CNPC's introduction into Sudan and its path to becoming most influential oil company
in Sudan); see also Gerald Butt, Thirst for Crude Pulling China into Sudan, DAILY STAR
(Leb.), Aug. 17, 2004 (noting that CNPC is largest shareholder in Greater Nile Petro-
leum Operating Company ("GNPOC")); Goodman, supra note 8 (describing China's
interests in GNPOC). Other members of the GNPOC consortium included Malaysia's
Petronas (thirty percent share), Canada's Arakis (twenty-five percent share) and Su-
dan's Sudapet (five percent share). See COAL. INT'LJUSTICE, supra, at 20-21 (describing
formation of GNPOC). For an extensive discussion of CNPC's history in Sudan, see L.
Jakobson & Z. Daojiong, China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security, 13 ASIA PAC. REV.,
No. 2 (2006), at 60, 66-68.
12. See BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGYJUNE 2007 at 8 (2007), available at
http://bp.com/statisticalreview (showing that between 1997 and 2006, Sudan's oil pro-
duction rose from 9000 barrels per day to 397,000 barrels per day). For a more detailed
account of GNPOC's efforts to establish Sudan's oil industry, see COAL. INT'L JUSTICE,
supra note 11, at 20-22 (describing rise of GNPOC as Sudan's most influential oil com-
pany).
13. See U.N. Gen. Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, 1 77, U.N. Doc.
A/54/467 (Oct. 14, 1999) (prepared by Leonardo Franco) (reporting that Sudanese gov-
ernment used bombers, helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery to clear 100 kilometer
area around Heglig oil fields in May 1999); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, 4, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2002/46 (Jan. 23, 2002) (prepared by Gerhart Baum) (contending that
"oil exploitation is closely linked to the conflict which.., is mainly a war for the control
of resources and, thus, power").
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Khartoum to secure their oil operations14 and allowing Sudanese
military forces to use the companies' air strips, landing pads, and
mechanical support."
As a result of its efforts to develop Sudan's oil industry,
CNPC has become Sudan's largest foreign investor, with approx-
imately US$5 billion invested in oil field development 6 and
US$7-8 billion in total assets in Sudan. 17 Approximately seven to
eight percent of China's oil is now drawn from Sudan, making
the African nation China's fourth largest supplier of oil, and
China is responsible for purchasing between sixty and eighty-five
percent of Sudan's 500,000 barrel per day production.18 This
14. See Amnesty Int'l, Sudan: The Human Price of Oil, 12-13, Al Index AFR 54/01/
OOERR, May 3, 2000 (noting that Sudanese government uses government-allied armed
militias, such as Popular Defence Force, to provide foreign oil companies with protec-
tion); see also COAL. INT'L JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 22 (describing long-standing rela-
tionship between foreign oil companies and Sudanese military forces, including in-
stances of Sudanese government soldiers securing oil operations); Goodman, supra
note 8 (quoting Chinese foreign affairs official as saying that Chinese oil companies
asked Sudanese government to "send troops" to areas where Chinese oil companies
operate).
15. See CHRISTIAN AID, THE SCORCHED EARTH: OIL AND WAR IN SUDAN 3 (2001),
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/chr-aid-sudl4marl.pdf
(finding that Sudanese government forces fighting in southern Sudan use oil company
infrastructure, including air strips and oil roads, to carry out attacks on civilians); JOHN
HARKER, HUMAN SECURITY IN SUDAN: THE REPORT OF A CANADIAN ASSESSMENT MISSION
16 (2000) (reporting that Sudanese military aircraft have used air strip at Heglig oil
field); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 288-89 (2003) (quoting
Canadian and British non-governmental investigation finding that Sudanese military
forces conducted attacks on civilians from GNPOC oil facilities).
16. As a whole, China has invested at least US$15 billion in Sudan since 1999. See
F. William Engdahl, Darfur: Forget Genocide, There's Oil, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Hong
Kong), May 25, 2007, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/
2007/0525forget.htm (highlighting scope of China's investment in Sudan's oil sector);
Danna Harman, In Sudan, China Focuses on Oil, Not Local Needs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 25, 2007, at 11 (describing Chinese investment in Paloich, Sudan, including 900-
mile pipeline from oil fields to Port Sudan, tarmac road leading to Khartoum, and new
airport with flights to Beijing).
17. See Downs, supra note 9, at 58 (reporting US$7 billion estimate based on data
from Wood Mackenzie, leading research and consulting service for global energy indus-
try); Energy Information Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008) (estimating
that CNPC has invested over US$8 billion in Sudan's oil sector).
18. See David Blair, Oil-Hungy China Takes Sudan Under Its Wing, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Apr. 23, 2005, at 16 (estimating that Sudan provides approximately seven
percent of China's oil imports); Engdahl, supra note 16 (describing extent of China's
oil interests in Sudan); Harman, supra note 16 (stating that Sudan sells vast majority of
its oil to China); see also Kristina Nwazota, China-Sudan Trade Relations Complicate Darfur
Crisis, ONLINE NEwsHOUR, Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/
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economic relationship runs even deeper than oil, however.
China purchases seventy-one percent of Sudan's global exports19
and is a source of significant economic aid. In February 2007,
China promised to cancel US$80 million in Sudanese public
debt and provide another US$120 million in grants and loans
for a new presidential palace and various infrastructure
projects. 2' This substantially exceeded China's pledge of US$5.2
million in humanitarian aid to ease the suffering in Darfur.2'
The arms trade is an even more controversial realm of coop-
eration between the governments of China and Sudan. Sudan's
newly developed oil exporting business provides it with the nec-
essary cash flow to purchase arms, many from China itself, that it
uses to protect Chinese oil interests and supply the militia
groups responsible for human rights atrocities in Darfur. 22 For
example, in the spring of 2002, the Sudanese military used Chi-
china-darfur_- 04-25-06.html (estimating that China buys seventy percent of Sudan's oil).
For a more extensive discussion of China's energy profile, see DANIEL H. ROSEN &
TREVOR HOUSER, CHINA ENERGY: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (2007), available at http:/
/www.iie.com/publications/papers/rosen0507.pdf.
19. See Save Darfur Coal., supra note 5 (describing China as Sudan's largest trading
partner); see also Arms, Oil, and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations Between China and Su-
dan, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, July 2007, at 6-7 [hereinafter Arms, Oil, and Darfur] (citing
Chinese Ministry of Commerce report that bilateral trade between China and Sudan
increased from US$2.56 billion in 2004 to US$3.91 billion in 2005).
20. See Chinese President Tells Sudan Counterpart to Give U.N. Bigger Role in Resolving
Darfur Conflict, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/ap/2007/02/3/africa/AF-GEN-Sudan-China.php (reporting that at February
meeting with Sudanese President al-Bashir, Chinese President Hu reduced import tar-
iffs on Sudanese goods, granted loan of US$77.4 million, gave grant of US$40 million,
and canceled debts of US$60.7 million and US$19 million); see also Save Darfur Coal.,
supra note 5 (describing China's significant economic aid to Sudan).
21. See Save Darfur Coal., supra note 5 (reporting China's recent pledge of human-
itarian assistance to Darfur); see also Arms, Oil, and Darfur, supra note 19, at 7-8 (recog-
nizing China's "modest" contribution of US$3.5 million to African Union Mission in
Sudan ("AMIS") while U.N. officials estimate annual budget of new hybrid force at
around US$2 billion).
22. See Amnesty Int'l, People's Republic of China, Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights
Abuses: The Flow of Arms Accelerates, Al Index ASA 17/030/2006, June 11, 2006, at 7
(noting that Sudanese government used increases in oil revenues to fund its military
activities in Darfur); Goodman, supra note 8 (reporting that oil revenues allowed Sudan
to double its military budget); see also COAL. INT'LJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 24 (pointing
out that oil revenues provide Sudan with funds it needs to purchase weapons to protect
oil interests). Since the 1990's, China has reportedly sold over US$100 million in
fighter aircraft and troop transport helicopters to Sudan, and helped establish three
weapons manufacturing facilities in Sudan, including one that assembles T-55 tanks. See
Save Darfur Coal., supra note 5 (summarizing China's extensive military cooperation
with Sudan).
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nese-made helicopters and weapons to conduct an offensive
against the Nuer tribe of Leal to clear the way for GNPOC's oil
exploration.3 International human rights groups have docu-
mented the ways in which the Sudanese government funnels oil
revenues into arms purchases.24 Abda Yahia El-Mahdi, a former
finance minister of Sudan, claims that seventy percent of oil
profits go towards arms purchases.2 5 With approximately seventy
percent of Sudan's US$5.26 billion in total global exports attrib-
uted to oil, 26 the revenues earned through oil sales enable the
Sudanese government to spend liberally on weapons and other
military supplies.
27
A significant portion of these purchases find their way to
government-allied militia groups known as 'janjaweed,"21 the
23. See Goodman, supra note 8 (noting that Nuer people lived in center of con-
tested oil field and China helped Sudan set up three weapons factories near Khar-
toum); see also COAL. INT'LJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 24 (describing Sudanese military's
efforts to expel local inhabitants from oil-producing areas); U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV.
[USAID], UPPER NILE TRIP REPORT (2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/
sub-saharan.africa/sudan/upper_nile-report.html (reporting on movement of inter-
nally displaced persons ("IDPs") as result of military attacks to secure oil fields in Leal
region of Sudan).
24. See GEORGETTE GAGNON & JOHN RYLE, REPORT OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO OIL
DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT IN WESTERN UPPER NILE, SUDAN 35-36
(2001) (recognizing that military expenditures rose as government revenue from oil
increased, including fifty percent rise in defense spending between 1999 and 2001); see
also COAL. INT'L JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 22-25 (providing detailed analysis of close
relationship between Chinese oil companies and Sudanese military forces).
25. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Far Away from Darfur's Agony, Khartoum is Booming, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 24, 2006, at 1 (explaining that weapons and ammunition remain
governmental priority in case U.N. imposes blanket arms embargo). Lam Akol, Sudan's
former transportation minister from 1998 to 2002, says that when Sudan began collect-
ing about US$500 million in revenue from oil production in 1999, approximately eighty
percent went to buy weapons. See Goodman, supra note 8.
26. See GAGNON & RYLE, supra note 24, at 35 (noting that Sudanese oil revenues
increased by 875.7% between 1999 and 2001, from US$61 million to US$596 million);
Save Darfur Coal., supra note 5 (describing crucial role oil plays in Sudanese economy).
27. See SAVE DARFUR COAL., CHINA IN SUDAN: HAVING IT BOTH WAYS 3 (2007), avail-
able at http://darfur.3cdn.net/2573d6e338d592b4a0_csm6beuk7.pdf (explaining how
China's investment in Sudan perpetuates current conflict in Darfur). Trade data for
2005 indicates that Sudan imported US$24 million worth of arms and ammunition,
US$57 million of parts and aircraft equipment, and US$2 million worth of helicopter
and airplane parts from China. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 3, at 7 (citing U.N. Com-
modity Trade Statistics Database ("COMTRADE") trade data for 2005).
28. Janjaweed forces reportedly carry new weapons and communications equip-
ment such as satellite phones, often travel in Sudanese government vehicles, receive
monthly stipends that exceed the salary of army soldiers, and carry government-issued
identity cards. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR IN FLAMES: ATROCITIES IN WESTERN
SUDAN 22-24 (2004) (providing extensive description of Sudanese government links to
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forces primarily responsible for crimes against humanity in Dar-
fur.29 Nevertheless, a recent study shows that China became Su-
dan's largest supplier of weapons just before the onset of the
Darfur conflict, and has remained so ever since.3 ° In fact, the
Chinese Defense Minister recently stated that military relations
with Sudan were "developing smoothly" and that China is "will-
ing to further develop military co-operation between our two
countries in all areas."'" This comes despite credible reports
that Sudanese government forces continue to smuggle arms, am-
munition, and related materials into the Darfur region in fla-
grant violation of the U.N. arms embargo,32 where they continue
Janjaweed militias, which it uses as a counterinsurgency proxy to attack civilians while
hiding government involvement). The Janjaweed militias primarily consist of a large
number of nomadic camel and cattle-herders who have historically been involved in
intermittent conflict with sedentary agriculturalists due to increasing desertification
and competition for land and water. Undoubtedly, their willing participation in the
conflict is to some degree linked to their interest in acquiring land and livestock for-
merly held by the sedentary populations of Darfur. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR
DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN
1 (2004) [hereinafter DARFUR DESTROYED] (describing long-standing rivalry between
rebel groups Sudan Liberation Army/Movement ("SLA/M"), Justice and Equality
Movement ('JEM") and Arab pastoralists with nomadic tradition of armed militias). See
generally DARFUR DESTROYED, supra (noting dozens of incidents where Janjaweed in-
vaded villages and stole cattle, horses, goats, sheep, and donkeys).
29. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DOCUMENTS CONFIRM GOVERNMENT POLICY
OF MILITIA SUPPORT 4-8 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/
072004darfur.pdf (citing Sudanese government documents illustrating its involvement
in recruiting and arming militias and authorizing activities resulting in crimes against
humanity in Darfur); see also Gettleman, supra note 3 (describing Janjaweed involve-
ment in attack on unarmed civilians in Darfur village of Muhagiriya on October 8,
2007).
30. See Arms, Oil, and Darfur, supra note 19, at 5 (providing statistics and charts
showing that China sold almost US$25 million in weapons to Sudan in 2005 alone, far
more than any other supplier). Sudan is not purchasing arms only from the Chinese,
however. For example, Sudan purchased MiG-29S combat aircraft and military
helicoptors from Russia in 2004 and 2005, and still maintains a significant arms trade
with Iran. See DAMIEN FRUCHART, PAUL HOLTOM & SIEMON T. WEZEMAN, STOCKHOLM
INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., UNITED NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES: THEIR IMPACT ON ARMS
FLOWS AND TARGET BEHAVIOUR 16 (2007) (discussing inability of U.N. arms embargo to
reign in Sudanese arms purchases); Arns, Oil, and Darfur, supra note 19, at 5 (indicating
that Iran was second largest exporter of arms to Sudan over period between 1992 and
2005).
31. See Mure Dickie & Mark Turner, China to Expand Military Ties with Sudan, FIN.
TIMES (London), Apr. 4, 2007, at 6 (quoting Chinese defense minister Cao
Gangchuan); see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 3, at 7 (detailing increasing number of
arms transfers between China and Sudan).
32. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 3, at 11-24 (describing continued flow of
illicit arms into Darfur, in violation of U.N. sanctions); U.N. Human Rights Council
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to fuel serious human rights violations.33 Due to this ongoing
conflict, humanitarian aid is unable to reach those who need it
and even international peacekeeping forces are coming under
attack from both rebel groups and Sudanese government
forces.3 4
B. China's Actions in the U.N. Security Council
Between 2004 and 2006, as the U.N. Security Council paid
increasing attention to the situation in Darfur, China came
under heavy criticism for interfering in efforts to take decisive
action to stop these massive crimes against humanity. China
consistently threatened to veto any resolution calling for sanc-
tions or other serious measures against the government of Su-
dan.3 5 International human rights organizations and Western
media alleged that China's oil interests were essentially prevent-
ing the Security Council from taking any meaningful action to
end human rights violations in Darfur.16 In response to these
[HRC], Report of the High-Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur Pursuant
to Human Rights Council Decision S-4/101, 38-57, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80 (Mar. 9,
2007) [hereinafter HRC Report] (reporting that arms continue to flow freely and heavily
armed militia continue to operate across Darfur); see also S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 2
(imposing arms embargo on all non-governmental combatants in Darfur); S.C. Res.
1591, supra note 2 (strengthening arms embargo to cover all parties to conflict in Dar-
fur).
33. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 3, at 11-24 (connecting smuggled arms to serious
human rights abuses in Darfur); Getdeman, supra note 3 (reporting October 8, 2007
attack on unarmed civilians in Darfur).
34. According to Human Rights Watch, the Sudanese government uses a multi-
tude of official restrictions, harassment, and intimidation against international relief
agencies seeking to bring humanitarian aid to Darfur. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DAR-
FUR: HUMANITARIAN AID UNDER SIEGE 11-25 (2006) (detailing efforts of Sudanese gov-
ernment to obstruct humanitarian workers' access to Darfur and rebel attacks on hu-
manitarian agencies and workers); see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., China's Genocide
Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, at A23 (noting that on Jan. 7, 2008, Sudanese mili-
tary ambushed clearly marked U.N. convoy of peacekeepers in Darfur, later claiming
that attack was mistake); Lydia Polgreen, Peacekeepers as Targets: Darfur Attack Imperils
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at A3 (discussing Darfur rebel attack on peacekeepers in
Haskanita, killing ten peacekeepers from three African countries).
35. See Nwazota, supra note 18 (describing China's reluctance to support Security
Council resolutions taking action against Sudanese government); Goodenough, supra
note 4 (noting that Chinese pressure repeatedly forced United States to water-down
strongly-worded resolutions).
36. See Downs, supra note 9, at 58 (acknowledging CNPC's substantial investment
in Sudanese oil industry as a factor in Beijing's reluctance to support action against
Sudan); He Wenping, The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy, CHINA SECURITYJ., Sum-
mer 2007, at 23, 34 (noting accusations of Western media that China ignores, or even
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accusations, China cited its long-standing policy of non-interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of other nations to justify its posi-
tion.3 7 Exemplifying this attitude, China's deputy minister of
foreign affairs stated in 2004 that "[b]usiness is business. We try
to separate business from politics .... I think the internal situa-
tion in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to
impose on them. 38
As resolutions on Darfur have come before the Security
Council, China has used its status as a permanent member to
weaken the resolutions rather than veto them entirely.39 This is
consistent with China's general policy of abstaining or refusing
to participate in certain votes, allowing China to send a message
while avoiding the alienation of allies.4" Traditionally, China ab-
exacerbates, deteriorating human rights situation in Darfur); Goodenough, supra note
4 (reporting on human rights groups' and international policy analysts' criticisms of
China's response to Darfur crisis); Nwazota, supra note 18 (citing China's significant
business interests in Sudan, its increasing thirst for oil, and its longstanding policy of
non-interference as reasons for China's unwillingness to support international action
on Darfur).
37. See Downs, supra note 9, at 59 (describing China's reluctance to pressure Suda-
nese government due to its policy of non-interference); see also Yitzhak Shichor, China's
Voting Behavior in the UN. Security Council, CHINA BRIEF, Sept. 6, 2006, available at http://
www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb -006 018.pdf (providing background on China's
historical policy of non-interference).
38. See Downs, supra note 9, at 59 (quoting Zhou Wenzhong, former Chinese dep-
uty minister of foreign affairs); Howard French, China in Africa: All Trade, With No Politi-
cal Baggage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, at 4 (discussing shift in China's Africa policy from
counter-balancing Western power to pure big business). This policy of non-interfer-
ence stems in part from China's unwillingness to involve the international community
in its own internal situations. See Shichor, supra note 37 (noting China's belief that
Darfur is internal affair that government of Sudan, along with regional organizations
such as A.U., are responsible for solving); Nwazota, supra note 18 (acknowledging that
China does not want to support U.N. sanctions on any country for human rights viola-
tions because China itself is vulnerable).
39. See Shichor, supra note 37 (taking note of China's abstentions on Security
Council resolutions 1556, 1564, 1591, 1593, and 1672); Opheera McDoom, China's In-
terests in Sudan Bring Diplomatic Cover, REUTERS, Dec. 17, 2005 (reporting that China
abstained from voting on every Security Council resolution critical of Sudanese govern-
ment).
40. In fact, despite frequent threats, China has used its power as a permanent
member of the Security Council to strike down only three resolutions. The first came
on August 25, 1972, in opposition to Draft Resolution S/10771, which would have ad-
mitted Bangladesh as a member of the U.N. The second was on January 10, 1997, in
relation to Draft Resolution S/1997/18 authorizing 155 observers to verify the agree-
ment on the definite ceasefire in Guatemala. The most recent was on February 25,
1999, relating to Draft Resolution S/1999/201, which concerned the extension of the
U.N. Preventive Deployment Force ("UNPREDEP") in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. See Zhiyuan Cui, The Bush Doctrine and Neoconservatism: A Chinese Perspective,
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stains in votes on draft resolutions that it perceives as interfering
in a nation's domestic affairs or undermining State sover-
eignty.4 The Chinese government prefers that parties involved
in internal conflicts settle matters on their own, without external
intervention.42 China favors this approach in handling its own
affairs, such as the situation in Tibet, and does not wish to create
precedent for the U.N. to interfere in analogous situations.43
C. China's Changing Attitude Towards Sudan
In March 2007, the U.N. released the report of the High-
Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur (the
"Mission") ." Its account of continued violence and suffering in
Darfur strengthened calls for international intervention in Su-
46 HARv. INT'L L.J. 403, 406 (2005) (observing that China cast negative votes in Security
Council total of five times, mostly in relation to Taiwan); Global Policy Forum: Subjects
of U.N. Security Council Vetoes, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/
veto/vetosubj.htm [hereinafter Subjects of U.N. Security Council Vetoes] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2008) (noting that two of China's five negative votes in Security Council were
in combination with negative vote from Russia, thus not "true" vetoes). By way of com-
parison, since December 1971 (after the U.N. admitted China) the United States has
cast its veto seventy-six times, the United Kingdom twenty-four times, France fourteen
times, and Russia/the Soviet Union thirteen times. See Cui, supra, at 406 (highlighting
China's relatively rare use of its veto power as permanent member of U.N. Security
Council); Shichor, supra note 37 (providing historical background on China's voting
behavior in Security Council); Subjects of U.N. Security Council Vetoes, supra, (listing
negative votes within U.N. Security Council by date, Member State, and subject of veto).
41. See Shichor, supra note 37 (recognizing that China is reluctant to use its veto
power, opting instead for abstention and non-participation); see also Michael C. Davis,
International Intervention in an Age of Crisis and Terror: UN. Reform and Regional Practice,
15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 22-27 (2006) (describing China's general policy of non-
interference and its aggressive defense of robust notion of sovereignty).
42. See Shichor, supra note 37 (noting that Beijing is especially sensitive to issue of
sanctions and use of force under U.N. auspices, particularly when its interests are at
stake). But see Davis, supra note 41, at 23 (recognizing that China eased its resistance to
multilateralism over past decade by signing human rights treaties and increasingly par-
ticipating in international dialogue).
43. See Nick Grono, Briefing-Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect,
105 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 621, 628 (2006) (stating that China is leery of U.N. intervention in
civil conflicts due to fears it may lead to intervention in Tibet or Xinjiang). For an
extensive discussion of the situation in Tibet, see, for example, ELLIOT SPERLING, THE
TIBET-CHINA CONFLICT: HISTORY AND POLEMICS (2004), available at http://www.eastwest
center.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS007.pdf (providing in-depth analysis of historical
arguments of primary parties to Tibet-China conflict).
44. The High-Level Mission's mandate was "to assess the human rights situation in
Darfur and the needs of the Sudan in this regard... [and to] report to the Council at
its fourth session [to be held from 12 March to 5 April 2007]." Human Rights Council
Decision S-4/101, 4, 6, (Dec. 13, 2006); see also HRC Report, supra note 32, 1.
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dan.45 In the report, Sudanese witnesses and victims described
large-scale attacks on civilian communities by Sudanese armed
forces and government-supported militia, widespread rape and
sexual violence against women, and further instances of torture,
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by national secur-
ity and military intelligence personnel."6 According to the re-
port, the humanitarian situation in Sudan deteriorated to a level
worse than in 2004, as Sudanese government forces and armed
militia consistently attacked relief workers and blocked access to
humanitarian support.4" The Mission concluded that although
the U.N. attempted to take action in Darfur, its efforts were inad-
equate and ineffective due to resistance and obstruction by Su-
danese forces." A key recommendation of the report was for
the international community to adopt a fully unified approach
and take urgent action to protect the civilians of Darfur.49
Such disturbing reports out of Sudan invited increased at-
tention on China's role in the region.5 ° Western nations per-
45. See The Secretary-General, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, 7 1-
13, U.N. Doc. S/2007/104 (Feb. 23, 2007) (observing increased violence from Novem-
ber 2006 to January 2007 in Darfur, as Sudanese government forces, supported by
armed militia, attacked rebel forces and unarmed civilians, in contravention of
ceasefire agreements and international law); see also Gettleman, supra note 3 (describ-
ing Janjaweed involvement in attack on unarmed civilians in Darfur village of
Muhagiriya on October 8, 2007).
46. See HRC Report, supra note 32, 77 38-43, 76 (reporting that tactics Sudanese
government and Janjaweed forces used in attacks show failure to respect principles of
distinction and proportionality and represent grave violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law).
47. See id. 7 44-45 (noting that Sudanese government andJanjaweed forces killed
more relief workers in latter half of 2006 than in previous two years combined).
48. See id. 76 (concluding that government of Sudan participated in and failed to
protect population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes).
49. See id. 7 77(i), 77(1) (recommending that international community adopt
fully unified approach in addressing situation in Darfur through deployment of A.U./
U.N. peacekeeping/protection force and full cooperation with International Criminal
Court).
50. See, e.g.,JoHN GHAZVINIAN, UNTAPPED: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA'S OIL 287-88
(2007) (noting increasing U.S. frustration with China's willingness to do business in
countries United States is trying to pressure or isolate, such as Sudan, Equatorial
Guinea, and Zimbabwe); SAVE DARFUR COAL., supra note 27, at 1 (calling China's influ-
ence over Khartoum "critical" to prospects for peaceful resolution in Darfur); Arms Con-
tinue to Flow Into Darfur, Security Council Expert Panel Finds, U.N. NEws, October 10, 2007,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsD=24261&Cr=sudan&Crl (reporting
on findings of U.N.panel that Sudanese government continues to violate Security Coun-
cil arms embargo by shipping weapons into Darfur); Alexander G. Higgins, U.N. Panel
Calls for Action in Darfur, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 12, 2007 available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con tent/article/2007/03/12/AR20070312001 77.html
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ceived China as shielding the Sudanese government from inter-
national pressure in the Security Council, supplying Sudan with
tens of millions of dollars in oil revenues, and selling weapons to
the Sudanese government that it used to perpetuate violence
against rebels and unarmed civilians in Darfur." This percep-
tion led to increased pressure on China to support peace efforts.
Recently, influential human rights groups and non-governmen-
tal organizations have called for the 2008 Beijing Olympics to be
labeled the "Genocide Olympics" in response to China's position
on intervention in Sudan.52 Furthermore, an increasing number
of leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa are finding the Sudanese gov-
ernment's actions in Darfur reprehensible on human rights, re-
ligious, and racial grounds.53
In the face of this criticism, China seems to have realized
that it will not be able to deter the international community
from placing increased pressure on Sudan.54 Thus, Beijing has
assumed a more active role in solving the crisis in Darfur in an
(reporting that in March 2007, U.N. team criticized international community for failing
to halt atrocities in Darfur).
51. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15 (providing in-depth report of
ongoing relationship between oil production in Sudan, purchase of weapons by Suda-
nese government, and ongoing human rights violations in Darfur); Goodman, supra
note 8 (describing China's continued sale of arms to Sudan despite knowledge of mas-
sive human rights violations occurring in Darfur).
52. See Helene Cooper, A Diplomatic Victory for Hollywood, Ir'L HERALD TRIB., Apr.
14, 2007, at 1 (crediting actress Mia Farrow and film director Steven Spielberg, who
recently resigned as artistic advisor to China for Beijing Olympics, with convincing
China to send senior official Zhai Jun to Sudan to put pressure on Khartoum regime);
Helene Cooper, Spielberg Drops Out as Adviser to Beijing Olympics in Dispute Over Darfur
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at 12 (reporting in February of 2008 that director
Steven Spielberg resigned as artistic adviser to Beijing Olympics to protest China's
ongoing economic, military, and diplomatic ties to Sudan in face of grave human rights
violations); Editorial, China and Darfur - The Genocide Olympics?, WASH. POST, Dec. 14,
2006, at A30 (suggesting that China's stance on Darfur could lead to calls for nations to
boycott Beijing Olympics); see also Whelan, supra note 4 (reporting that attempts to link
crisis in Sudan with calls for boycott of Beijing Olympics have upset Chinese).
53. See Bates Gill, Chin-hao Huang & J. Stephen Morrison, Assessing China's Grow-
ing Influence in Africa, CHINA SECURITYJ., Summer 2007, at 3, 13 (noting China's suscep-
tibility to claims that it is impeding A.U. efforts to secure peace in Darfur); Wenping,
supra note 36, at 34 (discussing African leaders' recent realization that because conflict
in one area of Africa can affect neighboring countries, all countries must take collective
responsibility to ensure strong and stable Africa).
54. See Downs, supra note 9, at 58 (noting that the argument that China's oil inter-
ests are prompting Beijing to willfully ignore Darfur crisis is becoming outdated);
Amjad Atallah & Isaac Shapiro, Obstacles in Khartoum, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at
A23 (acknowledging that activists pushed China towards taking action to address situa-
tion in Darfur).
2008] PRESSURING SUDAN 1071
effort to establish itself internationally as a "responsible stake-
holder" in Africa, and to secure its reputation and investments
throughout the continent.55
In February 2007, while meeting in Khartoum with Suda-
nese President Omar al-Bashir, Chinese President Hu Jintao
stated that it is imperative to improve the situation in Darfur and
living conditions of local people.56 The rarity of Hu's public re-
marks and convenient timing of this statement indicates that the
Chinese are beginning to support the notion that governments
have a responsibility to protect their citizens from harm.57 One
month later, China's National Development and Reform Com-
mission, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry of Commerce, released a statement announcing that
China was removing Sudan from its latest list of countries that
enjoy preferred trade status. 5' According to that statement, Beij-
ing would no longer provide financial incentives to Chinese
companies that invest in Sudan.59 China continued its efforts to
improve the situation in Darfur by sending Ambassador Liu
55. See Downs, supra note 9, at 58 (stating that Beijing's involvement in U.N. ac-
tions enables it to protect its economic interests and redeem its international reputa-
tion); Gill, Huang & Morrison, supra note 53, at 13 (reporting on recent Chinese ac-
tions to exert pressure on Khartoum, including high-level diplomatic pressure); Good-
enough, supra note 4 (noting efforts of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State to urge China to
become "responsible stakeholder" in international system). See generally Konings, supra
note 9 (discussing China's growing engagement with Africa).
56. See China's Hu Puts Fonard Four-Point Principle on Darfur Solution, BBC WORLD-
WIDE MONITORING, Feb. 2, 2007 (reporting on Chinese President HuJintao's visit with
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum); Hu Puts Fonard Principle on Darfur
Issue, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Beijing), Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/world/2007-02/05/content_801432.htm (discussing Chinese President Hu
Jintao's four-point plan for pursuing solution to Darfur issue).
57. See Gill, Huang & Morrison, supra note 53, at 14 (noting that President Hu's
statement is "about as close as a Chinese leader has come" to supporting notion of
government responsibility for protecting its citizens from harm); see also Arms, Oil, and
Darfur, supra note 19, at 9 (commenting that President Hu's visit to Sudan showcased
China's public commitment to resolution of conflict in Darfur).
58. See Richard McGregor, Iran, Sudan, and Nigeria Off China Incentive List, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 2007, at 6 (reporting that China left Iran, Sudan, and Nigeria
off list of countries it provides financial incentives to invest in); see also Gill, Huang &
Morrison, supra note 53, at 14 (discussing recent Chinese actions showing increased
frustration with Sudan's handling of situation in Darfur).
59. See McGregor, supra note 58 (noting that previous incentives included tax
breaks and soft loans from China's large state-owned development banks); see also Gill,
Huang & Morrison, supra note 53, at 14 (observing that this move shows Beijing's disaf-
fection with Sudanese President al-Bashir's unwillingness to allow joint A.U./U.N.
peacekeeping force).
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Guijin, China's first special representative for African affairs, to
Sudan to meet with officials of the Sudanese government. Liu
reportedly expressed China's hope that Sudan would show
greater flexibility in its approach to Darfur by accepting a pro-
posed African Union ("A.U.")/U.N. hybrid peacekeeping
force.6" This effort seems to have paid off. On August 1, 2007,
Sudan formally expressed its acceptance of the U.N. resolution
approving the joint force,61 a potentially critical step in securing
peace in the Darfur region.62
China still maintains its economic engagement with Sudan,
despite the widely held belief that cutting off the Sudanese gov-
ernment's access to funds could force it to re-evaluate its stance
on Darfur." On the other hand, Chinese foreign policy experts
maintain that Beijing's economic relationship with Khartoum
gives it valuable leverage within Sudan that other members of
the international community do not possess. 64 While this lever-
60. See Alec Russell & William Wallis, Beijing Puts Quiet Pressure on Sudan, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 19, 2007, at 6 (quoting senior Chinese diplomat Liu Guijin: "In our
own way and through various means and various channels we have tried to advise the
Sudanese government to be more flexible."); see also Gill, Huang & Morrison, supra
note 53, at 15 (highlighting Liu's statements that Beijing used "very direct language" to
persuade Sudan to accept A.U./U.N. joint peacekeeping force); China Contributes to
Push for Peace in Sudan's Darfur, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Beijing), Nov. 6, 2007 (citing
Chinese ambassador Li Chengwen's statement that China has been actively involved in
development and construction in Darfur region to help promote settlement of Darfur
issue).
61. S.C. Res. 1769, supra note 2 (creating UNAMID, hybrid A.U./U.N. peacekeep-
ing mission to Darfur); seeJohn Sullivan, U.N. Security Council Approves Joint Force of up to
26,000 Peacekeepers for Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at A8 (discussing unanimous
Security Council vote to authorize deployment of 26,000 peacekeepers, world's largest
peacekeeping operation).
62. See Lydia Polgreen & Warren Hoge, Sudan Relents on Peacekeepers in Darfur, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A3 (reporting that spokesman for A.U. called Sudanese accept-
ance of resolution "a breakthrough moment"). But see Arms, Oil, and Darfur, supra note
19, at 9 (acknowledging watering down of resolution 1769 through removal of language
threatening sanctions on Sudan); Polgreen & Hoge, supra (stating that Sudan has made
similar pledges only to reverse itself).
63. See Arms, Oil, and Darfur, supra note 19, at 9 (noting that China's official policy
continues to be protection of Sudanese sovereignty); Downs, supra note 9, at 61 (citing
reports of international observers that without China's support Sudan would need to
take different approach to Darfur).
64. See Downs, supra note 9, at 61 (explaining idea that international community
needs China to assume role of "good cop" to make progress in negotiations with Su-
dan); Ambassador of China: Distinguished Relations Between Sudan and China Will Push
Ahead Peaceful Solution Efforts, SUDAN NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 6, 2007 (citing Ambassador of
China to Sudan's comments that relations between Sudan and China will encourage
peaceful political solution for Darfur); Geoff Dyer & William Wallis, Beijing Promotes
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age may be valuable in efforts to secure Sudan's compliance with
certain international initiatives, such as the proposed A.U./U.N.
peacekeeping force,65 China's close association with Khartoum
also complicates efforts to achieve a lasting peace between the
disputing factions in Sudan. China's presence on the front lines
of international peacekeeping efforts alienates those factions op-
posed to the Sudanese government, including the civilians of
Darfur.6 6 In fact, Darfuri rebels belonging to the Justice and
Equality Movement ('JEM") recently said they would welcome
peacekeepers from any country other than China.67 Due to
China's longstanding cooperation with the Khartoum regime,
rebel groups do not view China as an impartial third party capa-
ble of mediating peace within Sudan, or even participating in
peacekeeping efforts.68 To lay the groundwork for fundamental
change in Sudan, including ending crimes against humanity in
Darfur and providing humanitarian assistance to hundreds of
thousands of displaced civilians, it is essential that the interna-
tional community confront the situation as a united front.6 9
Africa Ties Ahead of Talks, FIN. TIMES (London), May 16, 2007, at 7 (quoting China Ex-
imbank President Li Ruogu: "In the long run, Chinese aid and investment will help the
resolution of the Darfur problem.").
65. See Gill, Huang & Morrison, supra note 53, at 15 (recognizing China's efforts to
persuade Sudan to accept A.U./U.N. joint peacekeeping force); Sullivan, supra note 61
(discussing Security Council vote to authorize deployment of U.N. peacekeepers).
66. See Chinese Unit Must Leave, Rebels Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at A4 (discuss-
ing rebel group JEM's demand that Chinese peacekeepers leave Darfur); Darfur Rebels
Spurn Chinese Force, BBC NEWS, Nov. 24, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
7111206.stm (noting that Sudanese rebel forces refuse to allow Chinese into areas they
control).
67. See Sara Hassan, Chinese Peacekeepers Arrive in Darfur, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Nov. 26,
2007 (noting difficulties Chinese peacekeepers will have in performing their duties in
Darfur); Darfur Rebels Spurn Chinese Force, supra note 66 (reporting that Sudanese Presi-
dent Omar Al-Bashir said Sudan would only accept non-African troops from Pakistan
and China).
68. See China Denounced in Darfur, CALGARY SUN, Nov. 25, 2007, at 11 (acknowledg-
ing rebel demands that China pull its peacekeepers out of Darfur); Darfur Rebels Spurn
Chinese Force, supra note 66 (quoting JEM rebel leader Khalid Ibrahim: "We oppose
them coming because China is not interested in human rights. It is just interested in
Sudan's resources.").
69. See, e.g., Grono, supra note 43, at 626 (claiming that only U.N. action can en-
sure coordinated, properly resourced, legitimate international response to conflict in
Darfur); Maggie Farley, World Court Seeks U.N. Pressure on Sudan, L.A. TIMES, June 8,
2007, at A12 (quoting U.S. ambassador to U.N. Zalmay Khalilzad on U.S. intention to
push for more multilateral sanctions if Sudanese do not cooperate in peace process);
Gettleman, supra note 25 (commenting that as long as Asian countries are eager to
trade with Sudan, unilateral U.S. sanctions will have minimal effect); Mathieu von
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II. INTERNATIONAL ACTION IN SUDAN: THE
OIL-FOR-FOOD PROPOSAL
In response to the current state of affairs in Sudan, Justice
Richard Goldstone proposed that the U.N. set up a sanctions re-
gime that would allow Sudan to sell oil only on the condition
that proceeds fund a U.N. escrow account dedicated to improv-
ing the humanitarian situation in Sudan. v" Although a similar
U.N. program in Iraq fell victim to corruption and maladminis-
tration, Justice Goldstone contends that the U.N. can avoid re-
peating those problems by improving the administration of the
program.71 This Part first examines the failings of the U.N. Oil-
for-Food Program in Iraq and then analyzes suggestions for
avoiding such problems in a similar future initiative.
A. The U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq
The U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq started out in 1996
as a creative, well-intentioned effort to impose strong sanctions
on a brutal regime while maintaining minimum standards of
health and nutrition for the Iraqi people.7 2 Operating for seven
years and handling approximately US$110 billion in sales of
Iraqi oil and US$39 billion in purchases of humanitarian goods,
it was the largest, most ambitious humanitarian program that the
U.N. has ever undertaken. 73 Although the Program was un-
doubtedly successful in improving the living conditions of many
Rohr, Ending "The World's Hottest War", SALON, June 13, 2007, http://www.salon.com/
news/feature/2007/06/13/darfur/ (citing expert on Africa John Prendergast's sugges-
tion that countries join United States in applying economic sanctions on Sudan).
70. Goldstone, supra note 7 (advocating for establishment of oil-for-food program
in Sudan).
71. See id. (proposing that U.N. learn from weaknesses of Oil-for-Food Program in
Iraq to build stronger program in Sudan, pressuring Khartoum to stop killings in Dar-
fur).
72. See Barbara Crossette, Iraq Gets U.N. Approval to Sell Oil to Meet Civilian Needs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1996, at A14 (reporting on institution of Oil-for-Food Program in
Iraq to raise money for food, medicine, and other urgent civilian needs); John M.
Goshko, Iraq Accepts U.N. Terms to Implement Oil-for-Food Agreement, WASH. PosT, Nov. 26,
1996, at A09 (quoting U.S. Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, who stated that Oil-for-
Food Program was "good news for the Iraqi people and good news for the United
States").
73. See Paul A. Volcker, Introduction to JEFFREY A. MEYER & MARK G. CALIFANO,
GOOD INTENTIONS CORRUPTED: THE OIL-FOR-FOOD SCANDAL AND THE THREAT TO THE
U.N., at x (2006) (noting that while Oil-for-Food Program was originally temporary, it
lasted seven years and involved US$110 billion in sales of Iraqi oil and purchases of
humanitarian goods); William Satire, Scandal With No Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004,
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Iraqi civilians,'7 it will forever be infamous for the corruption
and maladministration that led to the IIC's extensive investiga-
tion of the Program and of the U.N. itself.
75
1. The Implementation of the Program
Before the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Program in
1996, the U.N. maintained comprehensive sanctions on Iraq
since its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.76 Although the purpose of
the sanctions was to place pressure upon the governing regime
of Saddam Hussein, they also effected great harm on the living
conditions of the Iraqi people.7 7 Without oil export revenues,
Iraq was unable to import sufficient quantities of food and medi-
at A23 (recognizing Oil-for-Food Program as largest humanitarian aid effort U.N. has
ever undertaken).
74. See, e.g., KENNETH KATZMAN & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, IRAQ. OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM, ILLICIT TRADE, AND INVESTIGATIONS CRS-6 to 8
(June 14, 2005) [hereinafter CRS REPORT] (reporting that Oil-for-Food Program sub-
stantially eased, but did not eliminate, severe economic hardship in Iraq); The Secre-
tary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of Security Council
resolution 1409 (2002), 6-33, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1239
(Nov. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Report of the Secretay-General] (recognizing achievements of
U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in improving situation in Iraq regarding food, health, nutri-
tion, water and sanitation, agriculture, electricity, telecommunications, education, and
housing).
75. See S.C. Res. 1538, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1538 (Apr. 21, 2004) (endorsing Oil-for-
Food inquiry and calling for full cooperation of U.N. officials, personnel, and Member
States); see also Colum Lynch, Volcker to Head U.N. Iraq Probe, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2004,
at A21 (reporting on appointment of former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker as head of probe into Oil-for-Food Program).
76. See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0661 (Aug 6, 1990) (implementing com-
prehensive economic sanctions against Iraq); see also Paul Lewis, Security Council Votes 13
to 0 to Block Trade with Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al (reporting on Security
Council vote to order trade and financial boycott on Iraq).
77. See Storer H. Rowley, Sanctions Take Toll: Iraqis Are Near Brink; Hussein Unscathed
Despite U.N. Embargo, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1995, at 1 (pointing out reports of scarcity of
foreign exchange for food and medical supplies, increasing malnutrition, rising infant
mortality, and other health problems); see also CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-I
(noting that without oil export revenues, Iraq was unable to import sufficient food and
medicine, leading to sharp deterioration of living conditions between 1991 and 1995);
Volcker, supra note 73, at xvii-xviii (citing expert reports that nutritional standards
were approaching a point of crisis and public health seriously deteriorated since imple-
mentation of sanctions). By the mid-1990s the average Iraqi's food intake was about
1,275 calories per day, compared with the standard requirement of 2,100 calories. See
United Nations: Oilfor-Food Program Provides Lessons for Future Sanctions and Ongoing Re-
form: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations and
the Comm. on Gov't Reform H.R., 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement ofJoseph A. Christoff,
Director, International Affairs and Trade) [hereinafter Oilfor-Food Program Provides Les-
sons] (reporting on Government Accountability Office ("GAO") study examining con-
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cal supplies.7' The U.N. developed the Oil-for-Food Program as
a means of easing this suffering.79
Through the Program, the U.N. permitted Iraq to export a
limited amount of oil, with the proceeds funding a U.N.-con-
trolled escrow account for approved purchases of humanitarian
goods, compensation for victims of the Gulf War, and U.N. ad-
ministrative expenses."0 While Iraq was free to choose the com-
panies with whom it did business," a special sanctions commit-
tee of the Security Council, known as the 661 Committee, 2 was
responsible for reviewing and approving each proposed sale of
oil or purchase of humanitarian goods."3 The 661 Committee
trol environment U.N. established for managing Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq and
other key internal control elements within U.N.).
78. See CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-1 (finding that according to infant and
child mortality, caloric intake, and other indicators, living conditions in Iraq deterio-
rated sharply between 1991 and 1995); Rowley, supra note 77 (painting bleak picture of
Iraq in regard to embargo's effects on poverty, suffering, malnutrition, hyperinflation,
and resentment of international community).
79. See Volcker, supra note 73, at xvii-xviii (observing that Oil-for-Food Program
was effort to discipline "outlaw" State while improving living conditions for its citizens);
Barbara Crossette, Do More to Aid Nourishment of Very Young, U.N. Tells Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1999, at A7 (noting that U.N. started Oil-for-Food Program in 1996 to ease
civilian suffering under economic sanctions).
80. See Indep. Inquiry Comm. into the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme, The Manage-
ment of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume H - Report of Investigation, 12,
(Sept. 7, 2005) (prepared by Paul A. Volcker, RichardJ. Goldstone & Mark Pieth) [here-
inafter Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II] (recognizing that Reso-
lution 986 did not authorize Saddam Hussein to receive money directly from oil sales,
but rather directed Secretary-General to establish escrow account and distribution plan
for funds).
81. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 29
(acknowledging U.N. belief that most efficient way of selling Iraqi oil was for Iraq to
carry out marketing and sales in conformity with normal trading practices and that
U.N. engagement in trading Iraqi oil directly or through third party would be highly
unusual).
82. The name of the 661 Committee comes from the resolution that authorized
the original embargo of Iraq in 1991. See S.C. Res. 661, supra note 76 (implementing
comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq).
83. See U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established by Resolution 661 (1990), Procedures
to be Employed by the Security Council Committee Established by Resolution 661 (1990) Concern-
ing the Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait in the Discharge of its Responsibilities as Required by
Paragraph 12 of Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), 5, 8, 26-38, U.N. Doc. S/1996/
636 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter 661 Committee Procedures] (laying out procedures for 661
Committee review of oil pricing mechanisms and humanitarian contracts under Oil-for-
Food Program); see also Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume I1, supra
note 80, at 17 (noting that Security Council entrusted 661 Committee with reviewing
and approving all contracts for humanitarian goods and monthly pricing mechanism
for oil contracts). While the 661 Committee was responsible for reviewing transactions,
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made decisions only by unanimous consent, meaning that all fif-
teen members of the Security Council had to agree to approve a
transaction.84 Within the first year of the program, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan also established the Office of Iraq Program
("OIP"), which was responsible for administering all aspects of
the Program on behalf of the U.N. Secretariat.85
Although the U.N. created the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq
with the best of intentions, most remember it for the way in
which Saddam Hussein exploited its administrative weaknesses
to collect billions of dollars in illicit transactions.86 While the
IIC's investigation of the Oil-for-Food Program ran much
deeper, this Note will focus only on weaknesses in the adminis-
tration of the program that may help in the analysis of whether a
restructured oil-for-food program could operate effectively, or
whether the problems are too inherent to overcome.
2. The Problem of Kickbacks
The most important concession the Iraqi government ob-
tained from the U.N. in the negotiations leading up to the Oil-
it is important to note that its rules did not require it to take any action in response to a
report of a violation of the sanctions. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme:
Volume II, supra note 80, at 20-21 (explaining that with exception of information indi-
cating illegal arms trafficking, 661 Committee rules contained no obligation to inquire
or investigate illegal activity).
84. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 19
(recognizing that 661 Committee decided on requirement of unanimous consent
among all fifteen members despite fact that Security Council itself does not require
consensus); Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 6 (acknowledging that
each member of 661 Committee had authority to approve, hold, or block any contract
for goods exported to Iraq); see also Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Vol-
ume II, supra note 80, at 117 (noting that consensus rule of decision-making within 661
Committee limited effectiveness of Committee in responding to attempts by Iraq to
manipulate Oil-for-Food Program).
85. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 22-
23 (describing creation of Office of Iraq Programme ("OIP") as consolidation of Secre-
tariat's Iraq-related activities into single organizational entity, which assumed adminis-
tration of both sanctions aspects of Resolution 661 and humanitarian aspects of Oil-for-
Food Program under Resolution 986).
86. Over the course of the Program, Iraq was able to collect US$228.8 million in
illegal oil surcharges and US$1.58 billion in illegal inland transportation fees and after-
sales service fees on humanitarian contracts. See Indep. Inquiry Comm. into the U.N.
Oil-for-Food Programme, The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme:
Volume I - The Report of the Committee, 36, (Sept. 7, 2005) (prepared by Paul A. Volcker,
RichardJ. Goldstone & Mark Pieth) [hereinafter Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Pro-
gramme: Volume I] (providing data concerning illicit income Iraq received prior to and
during Oil-for-Food Program).
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for-Food Program's establishment was the ability to designate
both the buyers of its oil and the sellers of its humanitarian
purchases. 87  Iraq immediately used this privilege to funnel
transactions towards companies from nations sympathetic to
Iraqi interests.88 In 2000, the regime became even more aggres-
sive, requiring that oil purchasers make "surcharge" payments
outside the confines of the U.N. escrow account.8 9 Similarly, the
Iraqi government conditioned the award of contracts for the de-
livery of humanitarian goods on the seller's willingness to pay
additional fees for "inland transportation" and "after-sales ser-
vice," which were essentially illegal kickback payments to Iraq
disguised as legitimate business expenses.9 ° These illicit pay-
ments to the Iraqi government amounted to approximately
US$1.8 billion over the life of the Oil-for-Food Program.91
The failure to investigate and put an end to these practices
is in large part due to the U.N.'s lack of a sufficient administra-
87. Under the Oil-for-Food Program, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and its marketing
arm, Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization ("SOMO") had full discretion to choose
their customers and how much oil to sell to each one. See Indep. Inquiry Comm. into
the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme, Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi
Regime, 15-18, (Oct. 27, 2005) (prepared by Paul A. Volcker, RichardJ. Goldstone & Mark
Pieth) [hereinafter Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme] (describing how Iraq's
ability to choose its customers allowed it to use oil allocations for political purposes and
extract surcharge payments from those who it granted allocations); Management of the
U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 29 (noting belief within U.N.
that most efficient way of selling Iraqi oil was for Iraq to carry out marketing and sales).
88. Saddam Hussein used this privilege to give preferential access to oil allocations
to companies from Russia, China, and France-nations advocating the lifting of sanc-
tions against Iraq-while essentially black-listing companies from the United States and
United Kingdom. See Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, supra note 87, at 16-17
(providing data on Iraq's oil allocations by nationality of beneficiaries, showing Iraq's
preferential treatment of Russia, France, and China).
89. See id. at 18 (finding that Iraq imposed surcharges on oil shipments from early
autumn 2000 until late 2002 and that surcharge amount varied from about ten cents to
fifty cents per barrel throughout that period).
90. See id. at 266 (noting that Iraq began to charge mandatory "transportation
fees" in mid-1999, and about a year later, expanded scheme to include mandatory "af-
ter-sales-service fees" equal to ten percent of original contract value). Significantly, Iraq
did not require suppliers to pay these fees at their own expense. Rather, it incorpo-
rated the charges into the contracts it signed with suppliers, which the U.N. funded
through the Program's escrow account. See id. at 269, 277 (observing that through this
system, Iraq illicitly obtained escrow funds and only disadvantage to suppliers was hav-
ing to lay out money for fees before U.N. reimbursed them).
91. This number includes US$228.8 million in oil surcharges and US$1.58 billion
in humanitarian kickbacks. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume I,
supra note 86, at 36 (providing data concerning illicit income Iraq received prior to and
during Oil-for-Food Program).
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tive structure to effectively control this large and complex pro-
gram.92 In its investigation, the IIC observed that within the
U.N. agencies responsible for the functioning of the Program,
there was an almost uniform tendency to avoid responsibility for
performing the tasks necessary to ensure the Program's suc-
cess.93 The Security Council's 661 Committee paid little atten-
tion to oversight of the economic activities related to the Pro-
gram, including monitoring the price and value of Iraq's con-
tracts. 4 This was due in part to the fact that the Security
Council understaffed nearly every facet of the oversight process,
particularly the review of commodity contracts.9 5
92. See id. at 61 (observing that U.N. was ill-equipped in terms of experience and
administrative capacity to deal with political pressures and sudden demands of excep-
tionally large and complex humanitarian program).
93. See id. at 60 (concluding that combination of providing Iraq with far-reaching
powers to shape Oil-for-Food Program and retaining substantial elements of administra-
tive and operational control within Security Council's 661 Committee led to dilution of
individual and institutional responsibility).
94. See Indep. Inquiry Comm. into the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme, The Manage-
ment of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume III - Report of Investigation, 31-32,
(Sept. 7, 2005) (prepared by Paul A. Volcker, RichardJ. Goldstone & Mark Pieth) [here-
inafter Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume III] (reporting that cus-
toms experts lacked expertise in international commodities, conducted only limited
review of contracts, and were unclear about scope of OIP's authority to reject contracts
on pricing grounds); Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 4 (comment-
ing that U.N. established "weak control environment" for enforcing sanctions and man-
aging Oil-for-Food Program).
95. For example, the 661 Committee's rules required it to select "at least four inde-
pendent experts in international oil trade" to assist with ensuring that Iraq sold oil only
at fair market value and to ensure that transactions were not fraudulent or deceptive.
See 661 Committee Procedures, supra note 83, 1, 9 (providing that 661 Committee was to
select oil overseers to assess pricing mechanisms and ensure that all contracts comply
with Resolution 986). When one overseer resigned within several months and another
resigned for health reasons in 1998, the Committee did not replace them. Then in
1999, another resigned, meaning just one overseer was responsible for billions of dol-
lars in oil deals until the Committee finally agreed on replacements in the summer of
2000. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 121-
25 (describing events leading to inadequate staffing of oil overseers); Oil-for-Food Pro-
gram Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 13 (suggesting that inadequate number of over-
seers monitoring Iraq's oil pricing over fourteen month period from June 1999 to Au-
gust 2000 was factor in Iraq's ability to levy illicit surcharges on oil contracts); see also
Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 7 (noting that while United States
dedicated approximately sixty personnel to examine humanitarian contracts for items
that Iraq could use for military purposes, neither United States nor U.N. paid such
close attention to pricing anomalies); Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77,
at 14 (noting that Office of Internal Oversight Services ("OIOS") assigned only between
two and six auditors to Program when it needed twelve for every US$1 billion in ex-
penditures, or more than 160 auditors at Program's height in 2000).
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Yet another problem was that no single committee was ac-
countable for the management and oversight of the program in
its entirety. The Security Council failed to efficiently allocate the
distribution of administrative duties between the 661 Committee
and the OIP, leading to confusion between them as to which was
responsible for particular administrative tasks.9 6 Consequently,
neither committee took action to stop Iraq from demanding
kickbacks on sales of oil and purchases of humanitarian goods,
even after reports of such behavior surfaced in the international
media. 7
3. Illicit Oil Smuggling
Another disturbing finding of the IIC was that throughout
the course of the Oil-for Food Program, Iraq sold substantial
amounts of oil directly to Jordan, Turkey, and Syria.9" These
shipments explicitly contravened the U.N. embargo on sales of
Iraqi oil outside the confines of the Program.99 Over the life of
the embargo, from 1991 to 2003, the Iraqi government was able
to smuggle between US$9 billion and US$11 billion in oil to its
neighboring countries by truck, pipeline, and tanker.1 °°
96. For example, OIP was responsible for examining commodity contracts for
price and value before submitting them to the 661 Committee, yet OIP did not have the
authority to reject contracts on pricing grounds or hire customs experts with the ability
to conduct pricing evaluations. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at
9-10 (commenting on absence of clear lines of authority and responsibility within ad-
ministration of Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq).
97. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, Iraq is Running Payoff Racket, U.N. Aides Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, at Al (describing how Iraq included fraudulent supplemental
charges such as "inland transportation" in its humanitarian contracts); James Norman,
Petrodollars, PLATr's OILGRAM NEWS, Nov. 16, 1998, at 3 (predicting how Iraq would
likely use below-market oil pricing to derive illicit payments to fund illegal activities).
98. See generally Management of the UN. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note
80, at 185-259 (providing extensive discussion of Iraq's illegal smuggling operations and
Security Council's awareness of massive amounts of border trade activity outside Oil-for-
Food Program).
99. See S.C. Res. 986, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995) (authorizing limited
export of petroleum from Iraq provided that proceeds benefit U.N.-controlled humani-
tarian escrow account); S.C. Res. 661, supra note 76 (implementing comprehensive eco-
nomic sanctions against Iraq).
100. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DCI ON IRAQ'S
WAMD 24, 37 (Sept. 20, 2004) [hereinafter DUELFER REPORT] (estimating that Iraq sold
US$8 billion in oil under bilateral trade Protocols outside of Program and US$1.2 bil-
lion in oil through border and private sector cash sales, totaling US$9.2 billion); Man-
agement of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 187-89 (calculating
that Iraq smuggled US$6 billion in oil to Jordan and derived US$767 million in oil sales
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Members of the 661 Committee noticed these illicit oil sales,
but took no action to halt the transactions or recognize them as
violations of the sanctions.10 1 In fact, successive U.S. administra-
tions issued annual waivers exempting Jordan and Turkey from
unilateral U.S. sanctions for violating the U.N. embargo.10 2 The
United States and other 661 Committee members recognized
that the economies of Jordan and Turkey were dependent on
Iraqi oil, and decided to ignore these illegal sales to preserve
support for the Oil-for-Food Program and the Middle East peace
process. 10 3 Interestingly, the United Kingdom and the United
States did push for an investigation into illegal oil smuggling to
Syria, but Syria's allies in the Security Council, France and Rus-
sia, frustrated those efforts. 104 This led to a stalemate in the Se-
curity Council, where no permanent member took action to end
these known, flagrant abuses of the Program. The failure of the
U.N. Security Council and the 661 Committee to act on such
clear violations was characteristic of its attitude towards a num-
ber of cumulative abuses of the Oil-for Food Program in Iraq. 10 5
proceeds from Turkey, US$2.81 billion from Syria, and sold US$1 billion in oil products
to various other entities).
101. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 6 (noting Security
Council's failure to address pre-existing trade between Iraq and other Member States
and problems this failure created); CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-16 (pointing out
that Member States took no direct action to punish or stop illegal oil sales until Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom in March 2003).
102. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 6 (reporting that be-
cause Jordan and Turkey are important allies of United States, it refused to implement
penalties for violating Oil-for-Food sanctions); CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-17
n.20, CRS-18 (noting that every fiscal year since 1994, Congress included provision in
most foreign aid appropriations cutting U.S. aid to countries that violated Iraq em-
bargo).
103. See CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-17 to 18 (acknowledging importance
ofJordan and Turkey to U.S. foreign policy initiatives in Middle East); Management of the
U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 194 (describing decision of 661
Committee, without debate, to "take note" of Jordan's importation of Iraqi oil in viola-
tion of Oil-for-Food Program); Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II,
supra note 80, at 229 (citing Russian and Norwegian officials as saying 661 Committee
never addressed reports of illegal oil shipments between Iraq and Turkey, and that
there was "tacit understanding" that Turkey would access Iraqi oil).
104. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at
247 (discussing United Kingdom's request that 661 Committee send letter of inquiry to
Syria, and France and Russia's objections on basis that such action "would be political").
105. See, e.g., Indep. Inquiry Comm. into the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme, Interim
Report, 121, (Feb. 3, 2005) (prepared by Paul A. Volcker, Richard J. Goldstone & Mark
Pieth) (alleging that Benon Sevan, Executive Director of OIP, requested, received, and
benefited from illegal Iraqi oil allocations and failed to inform 661 Committee and
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4. The Forgotten Accomplishments of the Program
While most commentaries on the Oil-for-Food Program in
Iraq focus on its failures, it is also important to consider its ac-
complishments when analyzing the prospects of a possible initia-
tive in Sudan. When the U.N. first established the Program, its
primary fear was that it would allow Saddam Hussein access to
military supplies and dual-use technologies that Iraq could use
in the development of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD").106
Throughout the existence of the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq,
the U.N. successfully screened military and dual-use items from
contracts for the provision of humanitarian goods.1"7 This is in
large part due to the efforts of the United States, which devoted
its own resources toward the review of commodity contracts and
was responsible for ninety percent of the holds that the 661
Committee placed on contracts. 108 Some reports even claim that
the sanctions had the effect of cutting off Iraq's ability to import
conventional weapons and finance its military, intelligence, and
security forces.'0 9
The Security Council's 661 Committee also showed that
when it recognized and decided to address a problem in the ad-
Security Council about Iraqi humanitarian kickback scheme); id. at 77 (noting that
Banque Nationale de Paris S.A., bank chosen to host U.N. escrow account, ranked sec-
ond-to-last in cumulative ranking of banks under consideration); supra notes 98-101
(describing 661 Committee's failure to halt oil smuggling despite full awareness of such
activities).
106. See Barbara Crossette, U.S. Objects to Details of Plan to Let Iraq Sell Oil for Food,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1996, at A5 (noting that sanctions would remain in place until Iraq
dismantles its program to develop weapons of mass destruction ("WMD")); John M.
Goshko, U.N., Iraq to Discuss Oil Sales, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1996, at A22 (stating that
one purpose of sanctions was to force Iraq to eliminate its program of building WMD).
107. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 6 (acknowledging Oil-
for-Food Program's success in constraining Iraq's ability to import military items).
108. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 6-7 (noting that U.S.
experts assessed each item for its military application and whether item was appropriate
for its stated end user); JOHN G. RUGGIE, U.N. Assoc. OF THE U.S., THE U.N. OIL-FOR-
FOOD PROGRAMME: WHAT WENT WRONG-AND RIGHT? 3 (2004) (reporting that United
States and United Kingdom held up several thousand contracts due to dual-use technol-
ogy concerns).
109. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, U.N. CON-
FRONTS SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ 14-15, GAO-
02-625 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION] (observing
that while Iraq's annual military expenditures averaged over US$18.8 billion between
1980 and 1990, U.N.-imposed sanctions decreased that number to US$1.4 billion annu-
ally); Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 7 (citing study of Iraq Survey
Group).
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ministration of the Program, it was able to curtail the illicit con-
duct. For example, in late 2000 and early 2001, U.N. oil over-
seers noticed that Iraq's oil prices were far below fair market
value and the Committee began to receive reports that Iraqi offi-
cials were demanding illegal surcharges on contracts. 10 In re-
sponse, the United Kingdom and United States successfully im-
plemented a retroactive pricing plan, which curbed the ability of
the Iraqi government to elicit surcharges on oil contracts by de-
laying pricing until the time of delivery."' After this, it was no
longer economical for purchasers to pay Iraq's surcharge on top
of the cost of the oil, and the practice quickly dissipated."12
Most importantly, however, the Oil-for-Food Program was
successful in improving the standard of living and easing eco-
nomic hardship in Iraq. The Program generated approximately
US$64.2 billion in revenues and delivered US$39 billion worth
of humanitarian supplies and equipment.1 3 With the imple-
mentation of the Program in 1996, the nutritional intake of
Iraqis rose from 1200 kilocalories to 2200 kilocalories per day,
and malnutrition rates among children under the age of five
were cut in half.'1 4 In the health sector, the U.N. observed an
increase in major surgeries performed, a reduction in communi-
110. See Management of the U.N. Oil-far-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at
136 (noting that on December 13, 2000, all three oil overseers first advised 661 Com-
mittee of information substantiating existence of Iraq's oil surcharge policy); Oil-for-
Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 13 (reporting that in early 2001 United
States informed 661 Committee of concerns regarding illegal surcharges on oil con-
tracts).
111. Retroactive pricing involved setting the price of the oil at the time Iraq deliv-
ered it to the purchaser. This helped ensure the U.N. collected the fair market price of
the oil and frustrated Iraqi attempts to extract a surcharge. See Management of the U.N.
Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 146 (describing advent of retroactive
pricing by United Kingdom and United States at suggestion of oil overseer); Oil-for-Food
Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 13 (illustrating initiation and functioning of
retroactive oil pricing in Oil-for-Food Program).
112. See Management of the UN. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at
150 (taking note of press reports in mid-August, 2002, suggesting that Iraq retreated on
its surcharge demands while oil sales fell as result of retroactive pricing).
113. See CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-6 (observing that total funds available
to Oil-for-Food Program were US$69.5 billion including interest and currency gains);
see also Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at I (noting that as of Novem-
ber 2003, U.N. delivered US$31 billion in humanitarian goods and services to Iraq).
114. See CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-8 (describing successes of Oil-for-Food
Program in getting food rations to Iraqi people); Report of the Secretary-General, supra
note 74, 6, 13 (pointing out how Oil-for-Food Program benefited food sector and
nutrition in Iraq).
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cable diseases, and U.N. agencies managed to halt the deteriora-
tion of water facilities." 15 The Program also gradually improved
the provision of electricity in Iraq' 6 and made great strides in
providing schools with the necessary supplies to maintain an en-
vironment conducive to learning.1 7 Although the implementa-
tion of the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq was far from perfect,
evaluation of its successes and failures has provoked numerous
proposals of ways to reform the Oil-for-Food framework and the
administrative structure of the U.N.'
1 8
B. Fixing the Oil-for-Food Blueprint
1. Administrative Reforms
Central to the IIC's findings regarding the implementation
of the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq is the urgent need of admin-
istrative reform within the U.N. The Committee noted that the
U.N.'s administrative infrastructure in 1996 was not suitable for
meeting the demands of such a large, complex humanitarian
program." 9 The IIC concluded that the Secretary-General, the
U.N.'s chief political and diplomatic official, needs the assistance
of a chief operating officer ("COO") in controlling administra-
tive functions such as personnel and the budget. 12  Placing ad-
115. The U.N. observed reduced numbers of cholera, malaria, measles, mumps,
meningitis and tuberculosis cases, and noted that there had been no cases of polio in
thirty-two months due to immunization campaigns. See Report of the Secretary-General,
supra note 74, 1 10, 15 (reporting significant improvement in delivery of health care
services and availability of potable water within Iraq); see also CRS REPORT, supra note
77, at CRS-8 (describing "notable" achievements in health and sanitation sectors).
116. See CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-8 (noting provision of electricity had
been "gradually improving" in November 2002); Report of the Secretary-General, supra note
74, 19-20 (reporting on decrease in duration and number of scheduled power out-
ages in Iraq).
117. See CRS REPORT, supra note 74, at CRS-8 (mentioning provision of 1.2 million
desks, or sixty percent of those needed, whereas students formerly sat on bare floors);
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 74, 23-24 (noting that local textbook produc-
tion increased along with provision of necessary school supplies).
118. See, e.g., RuGGIE, supra note 108, at 5 (warning against using failures of Oil-for-
Food Program as pretext for undermining legitimacy and utility of U.N.); Volcker,
supra note 73, at xxxi-xxxiii (expressing confidence that lessons from Oil-for-Food Pro-
gram can go towards improving administration of U.N.).
119. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume I, supra note 86, at 61
(observing that U.N. was "ill-equipped in terms of experience and administrative capac-
ity" to deal with political pressures and sudden demands of exceptionally large and
complex humanitarian program).
120. The creation of a U.N. Chief Operating Officer ("COO") would help to insu-
late U.N. administrators from political pressure in management decisions and provide
2008] PRESSURING SUDAN 1085
ministrative responsibility in a central location, the IIC stated,
would provide authority and clear reporting lines that were lack-
ing at the time of the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq. 12 ' A COO
would help in implementing effective controls and audits within
future programs to ensure that they have adequate funds and
staff, and are free of internal corruption.
1 22
According to the IIC, a central administrative authority
would also improve coordination between bodies and agencies
within the U.N.1 21 In setting up the Program in Iraq, the Secur-
ity Council delegated to itself, through its 661 Committee, opera-
tional control responsibilities that were often in tension with
powers of the U.N. Secretariat and the OIP. 124 This led to the
dilution of individual and institutional responsibility for the Pro-
sufficient authority for effective management discipline. The General Assembly of the
U.N. would appoint the COO on the recommendation of the Security Council. See id. at
63 (noting that position of COO would free Secretary-General of many duties more
suitable for chief administrative officer); see also id. at 61 (acknowledging that U.N. does
not choose Secretary-General for managerial or administrative skills and does not pro-
vide him with necessary instruments to exercise strong executive control).
121. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume III, supra note 94, at
31-32 (reporting lack of clear organizational structure between OIP and divisions re-
sponsible for implementing Program, most notably Contracts Processing and Monitor-
ing Division ("CPMD") and Programme Management Division ("PMD")); Management
of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume I, supra note 86, at 62 (citing Oil-for-Food
Program's absence of authority and clear reporting lines, especially to Secretariat's se-
nior management, as among most notable failures of Program); Oil-for-Food Program Pro-
vides Lessons, supra note 77, at 8-10 (finding that no single entity was responsible for Iraq
Program in its entirety, which undermined management and oversight capabilities).
122. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume I, supra note 86, at 61
(noting that political nature of position of Secretary-General undermines some aspects
of executive control, most notably personnel, where professional competence must
compete with political demands of Member States); id. at 62 (positing that corruption,
which reached upper levels of Oil-for-Food Program management, is symptomatic of
absence of strong institutional ethics essential to U.N.).
123. See id. at 62 (noting inability of U.N. to assess actual spending or insist upon
common accounting standards between U.N. agencies in Oil-for-Food Program); id. at
64 (suggesting that U.N. establish high-level coordinating bodies, with real decision-
making abilities and powers, for all major cross-agency relief and emergency programs).
124. See, e.g., Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note
80, at 181-82 (finding that 661 Committee members believed it was OIP's responsibility
to put holds on contracts for pricing concerns); Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Pro-
gramme: Volume III, supra note 94, at 25 (noting that OIP's Chief Customs Expert be-
lieved OIP lacked authority to reject contracts on account of irregularities); see also
Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at 152-54
(describing continuously changing responsibilities of 661 Committee and OIP in re-
gard to review of humanitarian contracts).
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125gram.  As Jeffrey A. Meyer and Mark G. Califano note in their
condensation of the IIC reports, "When things went awry-and
they did-.., no one was in charge. ' 126 The IIC concluded that
creating a central administrative office, under the control of a
COO, would instill this missing sense of institutional responsibil-
ity in the administrative infrastructure of the U.N. itself, prevent-
ing problems that plagued the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq
from occurring in the future.127
Although the U.N. is still operating without a COO, it has
managed to improve its administrative structure in some re-
spects. According to a recent U.S. Government Accountability
Office ("GAO") report,121 the U.N. has taken significant steps
towards improving oversight procedures,1 29 strengthening the
Office of Internal Oversight Services ("OIOS"),1"o improving
U.N. procurement practices,"' and improving the management
125. See MEYER & CALIFANO, supra note 73, at 178 (contending that Security Coun-
cil's failure to clearly define broad purposes, policies and administrative controls of Oil-
for-Food Program, and leaving Iraqi regime with far too much initiative and decision-
making powers, led to dilution of institutional and individual responsibility for imple-
mentation of Program); Volcker, supra note 73, at xxxix (commenting on Security
Council's failure to respond to and redress reliable reports of exploitation of Oil-for-
Food Program).
126. See MEYER & CALIFANO, supra note 73, at 178 (suggesting that weaknesses in
administrative structure of Oil-for-Food Program led to delay or complete avoidance of
important decisions).
127. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume III, supra note 94, at
169 (describing reluctance of Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General to ac-
cept responsibility for oversight and supervision of the OIP, which reported to Secreta-
riat, evidencing basic confusion within highest offices of U.N.).
128. U.S. GOV'T AccoUNTABILIrY OFFICE, UNITED NATIONS: PROGRESS ON MANAGE-
MENT REFORM EFFORTS HAS VARIED GAO-08-84 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT:
UNITED NATIONS] (reviewing progress of U.N. management reform initiatives in ethics,
oversight, procurement, management operations of Secretariat, and review of programs
and activities).
129. See id. at 15-17 (noting establishment of Independent Audit Advisory Commit-
tee ("IAAC") in June 2007 to "provide an external, independent assessment of U.N.
oversight capabilities based on best practices in private sector as well as experiences of
other international institutions").
130. See id. at 18-20 (acknowledging strengthening of Office of Internal Oversight
Services' capacity of its internal audit, investigation, and evaluations and inspections
sections).
131. See id. at 20-23 (recognizing that U.N. has made progress in strengthening
procurement procedures for U.N. staff and suppliers, developing training program for
U.N. procurement staff, and developing risk management framework). But see id. at 23-
24 (reporting that U.N. has made little or no progress in establishing independent bid
protest system or lead-agency concept for procurement).
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operations of the Secretariat. 132 On the other hand, the GAO
also found that little or no progress has been made in reforming
certain budgetary and financial management functions1 33 and
reviewing U.N. programs and activities.13 1 Unfortunately, dis-
agreements among Member States on reform efforts and a lack
of comprehensive implementation plans for reform proposals
have impeded U.N. efforts to enact changes in.its management
structure.135
2. Preventing Kickback Payments
The IIC concluded in its final report that from the very be-
ginning, the Security Council's basic design of the Program con-
tained inadequate safeguards to prevent Iraq from manipulating
the system. 136 The Security Council failed to anticipate that Iraq
would abuse the Program, and even once it became aware of the
practices, it did nothing to stop it.' 37 Measures such as limiting
the number or volume of contracts that Iraq could give to com-
panies from any one Member State and restricting Iraq from of-
fering allocations of oil to individual, political beneficiaries may
have impaired Saddam Hussein's ability to "buy" political sup-
port within the international community. 13' The above-men-
132. See id. at 25-28 (noting progress in improving human resource functions and
information technology). But see id. at 29-30 (acknowledging that U.N. has made little
or no progress in reforming its internal justice system or improving delivery of certain
services such as payables, receivables, and payroll processes and staff benefits adminis-
tration).
133. See id. at 29 (highlighting failure of U.N. General Assembly to approve or take
any action on Secretary-General's reform proposals to improve cash management and
operational flexibility, retain budget surpluses for use in subsequent periods, and
charge interest on arrears of Member States' contributions).
134. See id. at 30-33 (observing that although Member States agreed to review all
U.N. mandates with goal of strengthening and updating them to reflect needs of organ-
ization, ongoing disagreements substantially diminish progress in these efforts).
135. See id. at 33-35 (observing lack of comprehensive plan to implement manage-
ment reform efforts within U.N. and inherent difficulties in achieving consensus among
192 diverse Member States).
136. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume I, supra note 86, at 3
(concluding that neither Security Council nor Secretariat leadership was in command
of Oil-for-Food Program, leading to dilution of authority at all levels).
137. See id. (noting vast amount of power Security Council gave to Iraq in design-
ing and implementing Oil-for-Food Program and absence of effective auditing and
management controls).
138. See id. at 27 (recognizing that Iraq gave contract preferences to companies
from countries sympathetic to lifting of sanctions, most notably Security Council mem-
bers Russia, France and China).
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tioned administrative reforms would also help to ensure that
enough funding and personnel are available to adequately in-
spect agreements and contracts that arise from a future pro-
gram.' 39 Ensuring fair and reasonable prices for goods can miti-
gate the possibility of kickbacks by destroying the financial in-
centive for companies to participate. 4 °
Additionally, much of the fallout from the IIC's investiga-
tion into the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq will likely deter corpo-
rations and individuals from violating U.N. sanctions in the fu-
ture. U.S. federal authorities recently reached agreements with
a number of large oil companies including Vitol, Chevron, and
El Paso Corp., whereby the companies will pay millions of dollars
in restitution and fines for Oil-for-Food Program violations. 4 1
Six people have also pled guilty to criminal charges related to
the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq, including former Coastal Cor-
poration Chairman Oscar Wyatt, who was sentenced to one year
and one day in prison for his role in the scandal.' 4 2 Another
four defendants, including Benon Sevan, the Executive Director
of the OIP, have not appeared in court and are considered fugi-
tives by U.S. federal prosecutors.' 43 A number of other nations
139. See, e.g., id. at 61-63 (suggesting that creation of U.N. COO would centralize
responsibility for management of U.N. programs); Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food
Programme: Volume III, supra note 94, at 169 (proposing that creation of central adminis-
trative office would instill sense of institutional responsibility in U.N.).
140. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 7 (commenting that
Iraq may not have been able to extract kickback payments if U.N. did not neglect its
responsibility to review commodity contract prices).
141. See Ramsey al-Rikabi, Vitol Pleads Guilty to Oil-for-Food "Surcharges", INT'L OIL
DAILY, Nov. 21, 2007 (noting that under agreement, Chevron will pay US$30 million
and Vitol US$17.5 million in restitution and fines); see also Bruce Zagaris, More Compa-
nies Settle U.S. FCPA Charges, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Dec. 2007 (reporting thatYork
International recently agreed to pay US$10 million penalty for paying kickbacks to Iraqi
government for air-conditioning, ventilation, and refrigeration equipment and services
contracts).
142. See al-Rikabi, supra note 141 (providing commentary on guilty pleas stemming
from Oil-for-Food investigation); Texan Sentenced in Oil-for-Food Deal, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2007, at A21 (discussing sentencing of oil tycoon Oscar Wyatt, who paid secret kick-
backs to Iraq to win oil contracts).
143. The other three fugitives are Kathy Miguel and Mohammed Saidji, who alleg-
edly worked with Oscar Wyatt, and Ephraim Nadler, an associate of Benon Sevan. See al-
Rikabi, supra note 141 (reporting on indictments for activities related to Oil-for-Food
Program); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., U.S. Indicts Former Executive Director of
U.N. Oil-for-Food Program, and United States Businessman (Jan. 16, 2007), available at
http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel07/unitednationsfraudO11607.htm (an-
nouncing indictments of Benon Sevan and Ephraim Nadler).
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around the world have also sought evidence from the IIC for use
in criminal prosecutions, including Australia, Britain, France,
Germany, India, Italy, Jordan, Thailand, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. 44
3. Preventing Smuggling Operations
Another lesson from the Oil-for-Food investigation is the
critical importance of considering the effect of sanctions on the
neighbors and trading partners of the target nation. In formu-
lating the Program in Iraq, the Security Council did not address
this question by constructing special provisions for neighboring
countries that were dependent on Iraqi oil.' 45 As a conse-
quence, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria were able to purchase oil
outside the confines of the Program, allowing the Iraqi regime
to collect far more revenue than even the illegal surcharges and
kickbacks produced.'46 In any future sanctions program, the
U.N. must, therefore, consider the impact that the loss of trade
might have on surrounding countries.' 4 7 Specific provisions that
allowed these countries to obtain discounted oil within the con-
fines of the Program may have prevented the practice of smug-
gling in Iraq.'48
144. See Robert McMahon, Council on Foreign Relations, The Impact of the U.N. Oil-
for-Food Scandal (May 11, 2006), http://ww.cfr.org/publication/10675/ (providing in-
formation on responses of countries around world to Oil-for-Food scandal); see also Tim
Johnston, 6 Australians Face Millions in Fines for Iraq Kickbacks, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec.
21, 2007, at 3 (discussing civil cases in Australia surrounding illegal kickback payments
of Australian Wheat Board to Saddam Hussein).
145. See Management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume II, supra note 80, at
204 (reporting that United Kingdom official stated that political considerations led 661
Committee to not include trade between Iraq and Jordan under Program); Oil-for-Food
Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 6 (noting Security Council's failure to address
pre-existing trade between Iraq and other Member States).
146. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 6 (reporting that Iraq
primarily conducted illicit oil sales on basis of formal trade agreements); Press Release,
Indep. Inquiry Comm. into the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme, Illicit Oil-for-Food Pro-
gramme Payments of Nearly $2 Billion to Saddam Hussein (Oct. 27, 2005) (estimating
value of oil smuggled outside of Program was US$11 billion, while kickbacks and
surcharges amounted to US$1.8 billion).
147. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 15 (concluding that
Security Council may have prevented illicit oil sales by Iraq had it considered impact
that loss of trade might have on surrounding countries); see also McMahon, supra note
144.
148. See Oil-for-Food Program Provides Lessons, supra note 77, at 15 (acknowledging
that if Security Council considered impact of sanctions on neighboring countries, it
could have constructed provisions to prevent illegal smuggling).
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III. AN OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM IN SUDAN
While the ongoing situation in Darfur has had the attention
of the international community for over four years,1 49 the U.N.
has failed to end human rights violations in the region and pro-
vide humanitarian support to displaced civilians. 5 ° A complete
lack of cooperation from the government of Sudan combined
with Chinese attempts to water-down Security Council resolu-
tions has so far prevented the international community from
bringing human rights violators to justice and ending the contin-
uous cycle of violence in Darfur.'51 As a result, the Sudanese
government continues to fund attacks against rebel groups and
unarmed civilians while actively preventing humanitarian assis-
tance from reaching Darfur. 5 ' To achieve results in Sudan, the
U.N. Security Council must take multilateral, decisive action to
end widespread human rights abuses and provide security for
Sudanese civilians. 53
This Part argues in favor of the creation of a U.N. oil-for-
food program in Sudan, which would be similar in many ways to
the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq. It begins by setting out
the structure of this proposed program, and describes how it
would operate in Sudan. Next, it examines how such a program
would affect China's economic and political interests in the re-
gion and beyond, and concludes that China is not likely to inter-
fere with its creation. Finally, this Part explores why this oil-for-
food program would be successful in helping to achieve a lasting
peace in the Darfur region.
A. How the Oil-for-Food Program for Darfur Would Operate
Similar to the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq, the pro-
gram in Sudan would allow the continued export of Sudanese
oil as long as all revenues from oil sales flow directly into a U.N.-
149. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (referring to numerous Security
Council resolutions dealing with Sudan and conflict in Darfur).
150. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (reporting on increasing vio-
lence and worsening humanitarian conditions in early 2007).
151. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing China's threats to
exercise its veto power in Security Council if Council did not significantly weaken reso-
lutions against government of Sudan).
152. See supra notes 3, 47 and accompanying text (citing continuing reports of
massacres of Darfuri people and humanitarian aid workers).
153. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (acknowledging need for multilat-
eral action to achieve results in Sudan).
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administered fund, set up by a designated international financial
institution. 154 In this case, the U.N. would only allow Sudan to
sell to existing customers at market prices.
The U.N. would then allocate a portion of those funds to
pay for administrative expenses, substantiated production ex-
penses that oil producers incur, and a victim compensation fund
for the people of Darfur, while the balance would go towards
recovery projects and approved purchases of humanitarian
goods.15 Limiting the ability of Sudan to choose its customers
would prevent the Khartoum regime from trading oil for politi-
cal favors, as happened in Iraq.' 56 The Security Council would
also delegate oversight authority to a single, adequately staffed
U.N. committee responsible for all aspects of the program.'57 At
the outset, this committee would be responsible for establishing
provisions to assist any nation claiming that the sanctions on Su-
dan would harm its national interests.5 8 Additionally, the U.N.
would call on all Member States to assist in ensuring the imple-
mentation and effectiveness of the program.
B. China's Interests and the Oil-for-Food Program for Darfur
In previous years, convincing China to cooperate in the im-
plementation of any sort of sanctions regime against the govern-
ment of Sudan would have been a hopeless endeavor.159 The
current state of affairs, however, suggests it would be advanta-
geous for China to participate in multilateral action against Su-
dan for a number of reasons. In recent months, China has be-
come increasingly concerned with Sudan's reluctance to cooper-
154. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing fund set up for Oil-for-
Food Program in Iraq).
155. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (detailing allocation of funds U.N.
collected through Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq).
156. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting Iraq's preference to provide
oil allocations to nations that supported its political agenda).
157. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (recognizing that major
problems with 661 Committee were that Security Council understaffed Committee and
failed to clearly define its responsibilities).
158. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (discussing failure of 661 Com-
mittee to case burden of Iraqi sanctions on neighboring nations, leading to widespread
smuggling operations).
159. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (describing China's policy of
non-interference, and its particularly strong opposition to any form of international
intervention in Sudan).
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ate with international initiatives to secure peace in Darfur. 6 '
Some experts believe this is a sign that China is beginning to
support the notion that a national government has a responsibil-
ity to protect its citizens from harm.'61 Cooperating in the im-
plementation of an oil-for-food program in Sudan would provide
China with an opportunity to prove its good intentions to the
international community, as well as quiet critics who are threat-
ening to protest China's stance on Darfur at the 2008 Beijing
Olympic games.1
6 2
If China does not take some sort of action to halt the suffer-
ing in Darfur, it risks damaging its reputation as a responsible
stakeholder in Africa and its foreign policy goal of making eco-
nomic and political inroads into Sub-Saharan Africa. 6 ' Most im-
portantly, the establishment of an oil-for-food program in Sudan
would likely have little to no negative effect on China's strategic
economic and political interests in Sudan. China could con-
tinue to buy Sudanese oil in much the same way as it does pres-
ently,' 64 the only difference being that the funds would go into a
U.N.-administered escrow account. While the Sudanese govern-
ment will certainly not appreciate the imposition of sanctions,
Sudan is too dependent on China for trade and economic aid to
let this seriously harm their relationship.'65
Lastly, it would be highly unusual for China to oppose the
oil-for-food program in Sudan by exercising its veto power in the
Security Council. China has used that power only three times as
a permanent member of the Security Council, and has generally
160. See supra notes 51-54, 58-62 and accompanying text (citing criticism of China
for its stance on Darfur and China's recent assumption of more active role in solving
humanitarian crisis in Sudan).
161. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing Chinese President
HuJintao's remarks concerning need to improve situation in Darfur).
162. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (describing recent criticism of
China regarding its continued support of Sudanese government).
163. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (acknowledging growing discontent
among African leaders regarding Sudanese government's actions in Darfur).
164. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting that China draws eight per-
cent of its oil from Sudan).
165. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (observing that China is Sudan's
largest foreign investor, purchases sixty to eighty five percent of its oil production, sev-
enty percent of its global exports, and recently pledged over US$210 million in various
forms of economic aid).
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chosen to abstain on resolutions relating to Sudan. 166 Ab-
staining would allow China to maintain its positive relations with
Sudan while avoiding a confrontation with the Western pow-
ers.'6 7 Taking into consideration the current pressure on China
to contribute to multilateral pressure on the Sudanese govern-
ment, China's interests in establishing itself as a responsible
stakeholder in Africa, and its history of voting in the Security
Council, it is unlikely that China would oppose the creation of
an oil-for-food program in Sudan.
C. Why the Oil-for-Food Program for Darfur Would Work
The U.N. implementation of an oil-for-food program in Su-
dan would be a crucially important step in achieving peace in
Darfur. The U.N. must, however, avoid the recurrence of mis-
takes and build upon the successes of the Oil-for-Food Program
in Iraq.
While a central aim of the Iraq Program was to deny Sad-
dam Hussein the resources to re-arm and threaten his neigh-
bors,16 8 a parallel goal in Sudan must be to eliminate the govern-
ment's ability to fund the Janjaweed militias and purchase arms
that perpetuate the violence in Darfur.' 69 By taking oil revenues
out of the Khartoum regime's hands and carefully monitoring
purchases of humanitarian goods, an oil-for-food program could
be successful in depriving the Sudanese government of the
means of committing further atrocities against innocent civil-
ians.' 70 The U.N. could also use many of the lessons it learned
in providing humanitarian aid to Iraq to help the displaced peo-
ple of Darfur. 7' Although the distribution of aid in Iraq was far
from perfect, the Oil-for-Food Program undoubtedly helped in
166. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (explaining China's traditional
policy of either abstaining or refusing to participate in certain Security Council votes).
167. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (recognizing that China often ab-
stains to send message without alienating allies).
168. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (pointing out that one purpose of
Oil-for-Food Program was to prevent development and production of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq).
169. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (acknowledging Sudan's vast ex-
penditure of oil revenues on weapons and operations of Janjaweed militias).
170. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text (noting success of Oil-for-
Food Program in preventing Saddam Hussein from accessing weapons and dual-use
technologies).
171. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text (listing examples of humanita-
rian aid that benefited people of Iraq during Oil-for-Food Program).
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increasing the standard of living of the Iraqi people. 172
Specific characteristics of Sudan also support the proposi-
tion that it would be an easier place to administer an oil-for food
program than in Iraq. Not only does Sudan's production of oil
pale in comparison to Iraqi production at its peak,173 but an oil-
for-food program in Sudan would have a list of existing custom-
ers to which it could limit sales of Sudanese oil. In Iraq, an em-
bargo was in place six years prior to the implementation of the
program, so there was no existing sales procedure.174 Therefore,
the U.N. committee in charge of the program would not have
the difficult task of investigating the legitimacy of oil purchasers
in Sudan, as it should have done in Iraq. 175 A smaller group of
purchasers would likely decrease the administrative burden on
the committee and prevent Sudan from selling oil allocations for
political support.
An oil-for-food program in Sudan would also not suffer
from problems of smuggling because existing purchasers of Su-
danese oil will still be able to purchase the oil, at a consistent
price, after the imposition of the program.1 76 As for the kick-
back payments Iraq was able to collect on the awarding of con-
tracts for humanitarian goods, 177 the monetary and criminal
penalties that a number of nations have imposed as a result of
the IIC investigation should go a long way towards discouraging
companies and individuals from participating in such activi-
172. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text (recounting benefits of hu-
manitarian aid among civilian population of Iraq).
173. While Iraq produced 3.5 million barrels of oil per day at its peak in 1977 and
2.8 million per day at the end of the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq in 2003, Sudan has
never produced more than 500,000 barrels per day. See Engdahl, supra note 16 (estimat-
ing Sudan's oil production at 500,000 barrels per day); David Ignatius, Mending the Mar-
riage With Saudi Arabia, WASH. PosT, July 29, 2003, at A17 (reporting that Iraq's pre-1991
production level was 3.5 million barrels per day, and that its estimated production capa-
bility is 6 million per day); Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., After War, Let Iraqis Triumph, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at A19 (reporting that in 2003, Iraqi oil production capacity
dropped from 3.5 million barrels per day in 1977 to 2.8 million barrels per day).
174. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (recounting U.N. Security Coun-
cil's placement of embargo against Iraq in 1991).
175. See supra notes 89, 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing Iraq's require-
ment of "surcharge" payments on oil contracts and failure of 661 Committee to identify
and investigate such practices).
176. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (highlighting illicit oil smug-
gling that plagued Iraqi Oil-for-Food Program).
177. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting that Iraq collected approxi-
mately US$1.58 billion on kickbacks from contracts for sale of humanitarian goods).
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ties."' Nonetheless, the committee responsible for oversight
must be diligent in examining contracts for possible kickbacks
and disguised purchases of arms.
Finally, the imposition of an oil-for-food program would put
significant pressure on Sudan to cooperate with the U.N. in a
number of other important areas. The U.N. could use these
sanctions as leverage to: (1) finally implement the deployment
of a full A.U./U.N. hybrid peacekeeping force that would pro-
tect civilians in Darfur; 79 (2) force the disarmament of the
Janjaweed militias;8 0 (3) require cooperation with International
Criminal Court investigations of crimes against humanity in Dar-
fur;"' and (4) allow humanitarian aid workers full and unim-
peded access to Darfur. 18 2 Only after the U.N. achieves all of
these objectives will it be possible for the international commu-
nity to accomplish its goal of stabilizing the situation in Sudan
and building a foundation for lasting peace.
CONCLUSION
Although the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq will always be
remembered for its tales of corruption and maladministration, it
is important not to write off the creative ideas and good inten-
tions behind the Program. As Justice Goldstone wrote in propos-
ing an oil-for-food program in Sudan, "We should not let the
perfect be the enemy of the good."'8 3 Despite its many failures,
the Oil-for-Food Program was successful in achieving two of its
main aims: preventing Saddam Hussein from reviving Iraq's de-
velopment of weapons of mass destruction and improving the
standard of living for the civilians of Iraq.
178. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text (describing fines and prison
sentences that courts have handed out as a result of IIC investigation into Oil-for-Food
Program in Iraq).
179. See supra note 2 (citing resolution approving deployment of A.U./U.N. force
to Sudan).
180. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (describing involvement of Su-
danese government-supported Janjaweed militia in commission of human rights viola-
tions in Darfur).
181. See supra note 2 (citing resolution referring perpetrators of human rights
abuses in Sudan to ICC).
182. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing efforts of Sudanese gov-
ernment to obstruct international agencies from delivering humanitarian aid in Dar-
fur).
183. Goldstone, supra note 7.
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The implementation of an oil-for-food program in Sudan
could be the step that finally forces the Khartoum regime to co-
operate with the international community. The program's
unique characteristics would likely make it acceptable to China
and to humanitarians. The international community must act
now to cut off Sudan's supply of arms until there is no longer a
danger that it will facilitate further violations of international hu-
manitarian law. The implementation of an oil-for-food program
in Sudan could be just what the international community needs
to turn the corner towards a peaceful solution to the ongoing
conflict in Darfur.
